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Job Turnover: 
An Empirical Analysis 
Ann P. Bartel and George J. Borjas 
The question of  why an individual’s wages grow over and above econ- 
omy-wide productivity growth is  fundamental to the analysis of  the 
earnings distribution. In fact, explanations of  the earnings distribution 
such as human capital investments or random shock models are basically 
descriptions of the wage growth process for the individual.’ Despite this 
importance, and mainly owing to the lack of longitudinal data for a given 
individual, the empirical analysis of wage growth has lagged behind the 
empirical analysis of  wage levels.* This paper  is  a partial  attempt to 
remedy this asymmetry. We focus on documenting how labor turnover 
systematically affects the rate of  growth in wages both across jobs and 
within the job. It will be our working hypothesis to  interpret wage growth 
to be the result of human capital investments, both general and specific  to 
the job. We will also interpret wage growth across jobs as being due to 
changes in the individual’s  human capital stock resulting from “mobility” 
investments (e.g., search) and losses of specific training incurred when 
job separation takes place. 
Given this framework, we  tackle two important questions in labor 
economics.’The first is a variation of the old question of whether mobility 
“pays.” Note that the cross-section comparison of  movers and stayers (or 
in the migration literature, migrants and nonmigrants) does not neces- 
sarily provide an answer to the relevant question: does a person who 
moved during the time period  under investigation do better than  he 
would have done had he stayed? Of  course, the fact that the alternative 
wage is not observed once the individual’s decision has been made has 
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prevented researchers from answering this question. Recent econometric 
techniques dealing with selection bias in censored samples (Heckman 
1979) provide one method of  approaching this problem. In this paper, 
however, we pursue a somewhat simpler approach that utilizes the longi- 
tudinal nature of our data. In particular, we will analyze the on-the-job 
progress of  a given individual before and after the move. 
A second related question we will analyze is the effect of labor turnover 
on wage growth within the job. It is quite obvious that mobility shifts the 
earnings profile after each  separation occurs. It  is  less obvious, but 
equally important, that an individual’s  intentions to separate from a firm 
will  affect the rate of  growth of  his  earnings in  the current job. In 
particular, we hope to establish that job immobility (i.e., longer tenure) 
is associated with steeper wage growth than would occur otherwise for a 
given indi~idual.~  This finding should prove useful on several grounds. 
First of all, it establishes that indeed wages grow with tenure for a given 
individual. Although this may seem like a somewhat trivial empirical 
result,  it  should  put  to rest  doubts  about  the  interpretation  of  the 
observed positive relationship between wage levels and tenure. In par- 
ticular, there exists the possibility that this positive correlation is entirely 
due to population heterogeneity. That is, there exist some unobserved 
individual characteristics which lead to low wages and high turnover rates 
for some persons, and to high wages and low turnover rates for other 
individuals. Then a cross-section correlation of wages and tenure would 
be positive even if  wages did not grow at all in the job.5 
More importantly, by  establishing that wage growth on the job is 
related to the separation probability, we can obtain some estimates of the 
importance of specific training in the labor market. In particular, as long 
as specificity is an important component of human capital investments, 
the human capital hypothesis predicts a positive correlation between 
investment costs per year and completed job tenure. Since lower proba- 
bilities of  separation are associated with larger incentives to invest, we 
should observe steeper earnings profiles in longer jobs. Note that the 
prediction  implies not  only that wages grow on the job for a given 
individual, but that they grow faster the better the match (i.e., the longer 
the tenure). Therefore, in a sense, the “gains to immobility” are due to 
the fact that job tenure “matters” over and above the accumulation of 
labor market exposure. 
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to provide a systematic empir- 
ical analysis of  the relationship between wage growth and job turnover. 
We will use two data sets in the study: the National Longitudinal Surveys 
(NLS) of  Young and Mature Men. Section 2.1 provides a systematic 
examination of  the relationship between labor turnover and wage growth 
across jobs. Section 2.2 analyzes the effects of job immobility on wage 
growth. In section 2.3 we consider the implications of labor turnover for 67  Wage Growth and Job Turnover: An Empirical Analysis 
lifetime wage growth. Section 2.4 briefly describes the effects of personal 
and labor market characteristics on individual wage growth. Finally, 
section 2.5 summarizes the results of  the study. 
2.1  Labor Turnover and the Wage Profile across Jobs 
In this section we use the NLS Young and Mature Men samples to 
analyze the effects of  labor turnover on wage growth across jobs. There 
are several important restrictions in our use of  the data. First of all we 
define labor mobility to occur when an individual changes employers. 
Thus transfers within the same firm are viewed as part of the returns to 
staying in the job. Secondly, to simplify the empirical analysis we do not 
attempt to distinguish between local movers and individuals who change 
jobs and migrate simultaneously. In other words, we ignore the role of 
geographic mobility and its interaction effects with job turnover on wage 
growth.6  Third, our sample is composed of individuals who either did not 
change jobs at all in the period under investigation or did not leave the 
labor force after the separation took place. Thus individuals who were 
either retired or in school at the beginning of  the period or whose job 
separation was followed by either retirement or by a return to school are 
deleted from our sample.’ For both data sets we concentrate on the 
interval between 1967 and 1973, and partition this long period into three 
two-year intervals, 1967-69, 1969-71,  and 1971-73.  We then pool the 
information in each of  these intervals across the individuals in our Sam- 
ple, in effect tripling the number of  observations.8 The labor turnover 
variable  is defined to equal unity if  the employer at the end of  the 
two-year period is not the same as the employer at the beginning of  the 
two-year interval. Section 2.1.1 reports the results of  comparing the 
two-year price-deflated wage growth of individuals who separated from 
their jobs during the period with the relevant wage increases reported by 
stayers. In section 2.1.2 we return to the question addressed earlier of 
whether mobility “pays” for a given individual. 
2.1.1  Comparing Movers and Stayers 
Table 2.1 contains coefficients on dummy variables that indicate the 
individual’s mobility status over a two-year interval. These coefficients 
are taken from regressions using absolute or percentage wage growth 
over the two-year period as the dependent variable and holding constant 
a set of  standardizing variables listed in the note to the table (an exact 
description of  these variables is given in the appendix). It is important to 
note that these standardizing variables are measured as of the beginning 
of  the two-year period. 
The  coefficients  of the separation dummies may be broadly interpreted 
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among the young men a quit is associated with an increase in earnings but 
for the older men a quit has either a negative or zero effect on wage 
growth. Thus, for example, young men who quit receive a wage increase 
of  11 cents an hour more than those who stayed, while for older men the 
wage increase is approximately minus 3 cents an hour.9 On the other 
hand, in both samples, being laid off  from a job leads to lower wage 
growth than staying, although in the young men’s sample the difference is 
not very significant. For the older men, however, layoffs reduce wage 
Table 2.1  The Effects of Turnover on Wage Growth across Jobs  Comparing 
Movers and Stayers (Dependent variable =  AW or AhW) 
Absolute Growth  Percentage Growth 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
















-  .0264 




-.0397  -.0485 
(-.53)  (-.64) 
.1800 
(3.07) 
-.3545  -.3605 







-  .0253 
(- 1.35) 
B.  NLS Mature Men (n  =  4,745) 
-  .0488 
(-2.05) 
-.1907  -.1927  -.0972 
(-2.10)  (-2.13)  (-4.00) 
.1342 
(1.31) 
-.4641  -.4651 
(-2.81)  (-2.82) 




-.0299  -.0322 
(-1.60)  (-1.72) 
.0382 
(2.62) 
-.1269  -.1284 





-.OW9  -.0982 
(-4.03)  (-4.04) 
.0047 
(.I71 
-.1951  -.1953 
(-4.42)  (-4.43) 




Note: Other variables held constant are EDUC, EXPER, JOB, ARMY, UNION, HLTH, 
MAR, WLFP, WW, WKSUN, SIZE, UN, D67, D69; &statistics in parentheses. 69  Wage Growth and Job Turnover: An Empirical Analysis 
growth over the two-year period by about 19 cents per hour. An interest- 
ing result is obtained by  making a direct comparison of  quits versus 
layoffs. In the case of young men, a quit is worth about 14  cents more than 
a layoff; while for the older men, a quit is worth 16.3 cents more than a 
layoff. Thus although who gains and loses relative to stayers varies over 
the life cycle, the gains to quitting as opposed to being laid off  remain 
relatively constant with age. 
Of course, it is not surprising that quitters do better than individuals 
who were laid off  at all ages. What is puzzling is that quitters do not do 
better than stayers systematically over the life cycle. Further analysis of 
this result can be conducted with the information provided in the NLS on 
the reasom for the quit. Thus we decompose the variable QUIT (1 if 
change was voluntary, 0 otherwise) into two kinds of voluntary changes: 
job related or for personal reasons.'O The reader should, of course, note 
that these reasons are reported after the separation took place, and hence 
there may be some element of rationalization on the worker's part which 
may contaminate the results we report.  The coefficients of  JOBREL 
(job-related quits) and PERS (personal quits) are shown in columns 2 
and 5 of table 2.1. The results are quite striking. In both samples we now 
find that  individuals who  quit  for personal  reasons had  significantly 
smaller wage growth than stayers, while men who had a job-related quit 
experienced higher wage growth than stayers. This latter effect is signifi- 
cant for the young men's sample, but less significant in the older men's 
NLS. The results, therefore, imply a very significant differential in the 
gains from quitting according to the type of quit. Moreover, it is also of 
interest to note that layoffs and quits for personal reasons have similar 
qualitative effects on wage growth. This might be due to the fact that both 
these types of  separations have a large exogenous and unexpected com- 
ponent, so that these individuals would have had less search while on the 
job than individuals whose quit was premeditated. 
A further decomposition of  the variable QUIT may be examined in 
columns 3 and 6 where job-related quits have been segmented into quits 
due to dissatisfaction with the current job (PUSH) and quits occurring 
because the individual found a better job (PULL)." One may argue that 
it is irrelevant whether the change was due to a pull or a push since 
basically  the voluntary  separation occurred  because  the  individual's 
opportunities were better in the new job. That is, it is irrelevant whether 
the quit was due to  the fact that the present job was bad or to the fact that 
the new job was better. Either way, the new job improved the indi- 
vidual's situation relative to the old job. Although essentially correct, this 
line of  argument ignores an empirical peculiarity of the data: most of the 
individuals who said they were pushed from the current job gave reasons 
relating to the nonwage aspects of  the job.  Thus there is no obvious 
reason to expect any kind of  wage increase for this group. Indeed, table 70  Ann  P. Bartel and George J. Borjas 
2.1 shows that the effect of  quits on wage growth differs significantly 
depending on whether the quit was a pull or a push. A pull always leads to 
significantly higher wage growth than that experienced by stayers, while a 
push does not seem to affect wage growth at all. In general, the results in 
table 2.1 suggest that the nature of a quit is a very important determinant 
of the gains to mobility. Moreover, the results obtained with the detailed 
decomposition of  QUIT provide one explanation of  the fact that the 
QUIT coefficient varies over the life cycle. In particular, a quit is more 
likely to be due to finding a better job at younger ages, while at older ages 
the quit is mainly due to dissatisfaction with the current job. These 
results, however, are not entirely consistent with the matching view of 
labor turnover since the matching process-and  therefore quits due to 
dissatisfaction with the present employer-is  more likely to take place 
early in the  life cycle.  The fact that our data show the opposite is 
somewhat puzzling. 
Finally, one way of measuring the magnitude of the wage increase due 
to PULL is to calculate the present value of  this increase assuming both 
that the individual works full time until his retirement and that the wage 
increase due to the quit is general in the sense that it remains with him 
throughout his working life.I2  From column 3 the observed wage increase 
is worth $2,940 for the young men and $570 for the older men. Obviously 
the longer payoff period for young men clearly increases the return on 
mobility investment. 
2.1.2  Wage Growth prior to, during, and after the Move 
In  the  previous  section  we  conducted  an  analysis  calculating the 
“gains” associated with mobility by comparing movers and stayers. As 
was pointed out earlier, this procedure could create problems if  popula- 
tion heterogeneity is an important phenomenon in the labor market. The 
existence of heterogeneity raises two distinct types of problems. First, the 
separation dummies that compare movers and stayers can be proxying 
unobserved individual characteristics indicating both the propensity for 
turnover and the individual’s ability to “grow” on the job. Since indi- 
viduals with high propensities for turnover find it harder to “hold onto a 
job,” population heterogeneity would create a negative correlation be- 
tween wage growth and the separation probabilities. Moreover, if  one 
reason that stayers stay in the job is their better progress (or prospects for 
progress), clearly this would give a further downward bias to the “gains” 
to mobility. 
Thus unless we resort to somewhat more complicated statistical proce- 
dures, ordinary least-squares comparisons of  movers and stayers will 
yield hopelessly biased estimates of  the returns to moving. A correct 
answer to  the question of whether the individual gained by moving can be 
obtained only by  a comparison of the individual’s new wage progress to 71  Wage Growth and Job Turnover: An Empirical Analysis 
that which he would have obtained had he stayed at the previous job. 
Clearly the relevant alternative wage is unavailable once the individual’s 
separation decision is taken. A simple approximation, however, exists if 
we utilize fully the longitudinal nature of our data. For example, suppose 
we have a sample of individuals who either did not change jobs between 
1967 and 1973 or changed only between 1969 and 1971. Thus the basic 
difference between the two groups of men lies in their 1969-71 separation 
propensities. Suppose that we estimate wage growth equations similar to 
those given in columns 3 and 6 of  table 2.1 for each of  the subperiods 
196769, 1969-71, and 1971-73  as a function of  the 1969-71  separation 
probabilities. The coefficients on these dummies can then be studied to 
show how the mover’s wages were growing before  he changed jobs, 
during the period in which he changed jobs, and after the job change took 
place. If we are willing to assume that the effect of the 1969-71 mobility 
dummy on 1967-69 wage growth is indicative of how movers were doing 
in  the job  prior  to separation,  we  can  then  determine  conclusively 
whether a mover gained from moving by analyzing the behavior of  the 
separation dummies over the six-year period. In  particular, the individual 
improved  his situation by  moving if  the  mobility coefficient is more 
positive after the move than before the move. Thus by looking at changes 
in the mobility coefficient we are, in effect, controlling for population 
heterogeneity,  since  these  unobserved  individual  characteristics  are 
assumed to be constant over time. 
The results of  estimating these equations are presented in table 2.2. 
Panels A and B give the results for young and older men using the sample 
of  men who either moved during 1969-71  only or did not move at all 
during the six-year period. To show how these results should be inter- 
preted, let us consider in detail the effect of  being “pushed” from the 
1969 job on the wage profile of  young men. We find that prior to the 
separation, individuals who were “pushed” from the job had significantly 
lower wage growth than individuals who stayed in that job subsequently. 
Two factors explain this result. Clearly, the movers were not progressing 
well on the job and eventually quit because of  this. Secondly, if  the job 
was a mismatch, as it eventually turned out to be, and if this information 
was known to both firm and workers, the incentives for investment in the 
job were weak, leading to smaller wage growth (see section 2.2, below). 
During the 1969-71 period, when the move actually occurred, we find 
that these same individuals had larger wage growth than stayers. Again, 
assuming that the difference between movers and stayers in the 1967-69 
period is the correct comparison between the mover’s old job and the 
stayers’ job, clearly the positive coefficient of  PUSH on 1969-71  wage 
growth provides very strong evidence that the movers improved their 
situation significantly through job mobility. Moreover, we find that these 
gains were not temporary since the comparison of movers to stayers in the 
1971-73 period (after the move took place) yields the finding that there is 72  Ann P. Bartel and George J. Borjas 
Table 2.2  The Effects of  1969-71  Mobility on Wage Growth (Dependent 
variable =  AW or AhW) 
Absolute Growth  Percentage Growth 
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-  .2m 
.0220 
-  ,0096 
(- .03) 
A.  NLS Young Men (n  =  392) 
-  ,0391  .0579  ,0785 
(- .23)  (.47)  (1.24) 
-.3029  .2169  -  ,0320 
(- 1.34)  (.80)  (-.37) 
,3083  -.W  -  ,0693 
(1.94)  (-.23)  (-1.15) 
.6174  .3287  .0384 
(3.23)  (1.44)  (53) 
B.  NLS Mature Men (n  = 1,016) 
-  .5501  .1534  .0802 
(-2.80)  (.69)  (1.75) 
-1.1024  -.1143  -  .0301 
(-2.46)  (-.23)  (- .29) 
-.0932  -.2345  ,0129 
(-.27)  (-.59)  (.16) 
(-1.37)  (-1.45)  (.39) 
-.6126  -.7372  ,0407 
C.  NLS Young Men (n = 1,032) 
(1.40)  (-.43)  (1.47) 
.1157  -.5305  ,0515 
-.1187  .0417  -  ,0223 
(- .92)  (- .41) 
.1637  -.0467  -  .0363 
(1.75)  (-.34)  (-.91) 
.2202  -.0197  .0477 
(2.01)  (-.12)  (1.02) 
D.  NLS Mature Men (n = 1,379) 
-.1687  -.1519  .0183 
(-1.00)  (-32)  (.47) 
(-1.03)  (1.24)  (-.12) 
(- .08)  (- .58)  (- .53) 
(-W  (.W  (.32) 
-  .3616  ,4840  -  .0096 
-.0223  -.1771  -  .0340 
-  .1769  .1511  .0294 
.0201 
(.39) 








-  .3780 
(-3.13) 
-  0437 
(- .47) 
(-.54) 











-  ,1559 
































-  .0248 
(-.31) 
-  .0453 
(-.39) 
Note: The variables (excluding JOB) held constant in table 2.1 are held constant here; 
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no difference in the wage progress of the two groups. Therefore, we can 
safely conclude that individuals who moved used job mobility as a tool to 
achieve a better wage package. 
The reader can easily verify that almost (qualitatively) identical results 
are obtained for the other types of  voluntary separations in the NLS 
young men’s sample. For the mature men, this exercise yields somewhat 
mixed results. The reason is probably due to the fact that the separation 
dummies have very low means. For example, the frequencies of  PUSH, 
PULL and PERS are .0098, .0059, and .0059, respectively. 
It may be argued that these findings are seriously biased by the exis- 
tence of  selectivity bias since our sample consists of  individuals who 
either did not change jobs at all or who moved in only the 1969-71  period, 
so that the move was, in  a sense, successful. In  fact,  the use of  an 
unrestricted sample, where we include all individuals and relate their 
wage growth in all three periods to their 1969-71  separation behavior, 
barely affects our results as can be seen in panels C and D of table 2.2. If 
anything, we obtain somewhat more reasonable results for the mature 
men. 
2.2  Labor Turnover and Wage Growth within the Job 
In the previous section we have shown that labor turnover affects the 
wage  profile across jobs.  In this section we  demonstrate how  labor 
turnover also affects the earnings profile within the job. In section 2.2.1 
we present a simple framework for analyzing the relationship between 
labor turnover and on-the-job wage growth, and in section 2.2.2  we 
document empirically that labor turnover systematically  affects the slope 
of  the earnings profile within the job. 
2.2.1  A Framework for Analyzing On-the-Job Wage Growth 
One  way in which on-the-job wage growth can be studied is to interpret 
it as the result of human capital investment. If  no mobility occurs during 
the period t- 1  to t, then the absolute change in the individual’s  earnings 
capacity during that period can be written as: 
A E, =  E, -  E, - =  r,C, - 
where E, is earnings capacity at experience year t; C, denotes dollar 
investment costs in t,  and r,, is the rate of return to postschool investments 
on the current (nth) job. Note that C,  is composed of all investment costs 
borne by the individual. That is, it is composed of general investments as 
well as the share of  specific training costs paid by the individual. 
The change in earnings capacity given by equation (1) is unobserved. 
However, if  all investment costs are foregone earnings, observed earn- 
ings, Y,,  are defined by  Y,  =  E, -  C,. Thus equation (1) can be rewritten 
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(2)  AYt=rnCr-,  -(Ct-  Ct- l)=r,Ct-  + P, 
where  Pn  = -  (Ct- Ct-  Since, by  assumption,  no  job  change  has 
occurred, observed wage grc:vth  on the job is composed of the retdrns to 
on-the-job training plus the change in investment costs from period to 
period. If  the investment profile is assumed to be continuous and linearly 
declining (within the job), the change in investment costs is given by the 
constant rate  of  decline in investment  in  the current job,  P,.  Thus 
observed wage growth incorporates the saving in investment costs as job 
tenure increases. 
To convert equation (2) into observables, we hypothesize that invest- 
ment costs are a negative function both of  previous experience and of 
current job experience.” That is, more investment is undertaken the 
younger the individual was when he started the job and the shorter the 
tenure on the job. Of course, both these implications must be qualified by 
the fact that at low levels of  tenure there is a considerable amount of 
learning taking place as both the individual and the firm consider whether 
the job match is worthwhile. Moreover, at younger ages, as the individual 
learns about the labor market, “job shopping” might lead to an initial 
increase in investment. Thus it is possible that human capital investments 
may be zero or rise initially both with age and with job tenure. We assume 
that these  matching periods  are reasonably short so that  our  linear 
approximations do not greatly distort reality. In particular, if  IT,  mea- 
sures experience prior to the current job and en measures current job 
tenure, a simple relation determining investment costs would be:I4 
(3)  cr  =  con -  UnVn  -  Pnen 
Note that Con  measures the level of  investment that would take place 
initially if  the current job were the first job in the life cycle. Substituting 
(3) into (2) yields: 
(4)  AYt =  (rnC0n +  P” +  rnPn) -  rnunITn -  rnPnen 
Thus a simple regression of wage growth on previous and current experi- 
ence gives coefficients that are proportional to the effect of  aging both 
prior to the job and within the job. 
We can introduce the relationship between labor turnover and on-the- 
job wage growth by  noting that Con  will vary systematically with the 
probability of separation. That is, since a part of dollar investment costs is 
specific to the current job, there will be a positive correlation between the 
level of  the investment profile (measured by  Con)  and expected com- 
pleted job duration. In other words, the individual and the firm will invest 
more in longer jobs because they can both collect the returns to specific 
training over a longer period of time. Simultaneously, those individuals 
who have invested more on the job will have an incentive to stay longer.’> 75  Wage Growth and Job Turnover: An Empirical Analysis 
Denoting by (  the expected  completed  tenure in  the job  as of  the 
beginning of  the job, this implies: 
(5)  con =  an + PL 
If  longitudinal data are used, information on 6 is generally available as 
long as actual events closely parallel expectations. If  we make the sim- 
plifying assumption that actual completed tenure equals (  as a first-order 
approximation, and if we observe a sample of individuals  changing  jobs at 
some point during the survey, then it is possible to estimate the parameter 
p, (times a constant). In particular, rewrite (  as: 
(=e,+R, 
where en  is current job tenure and R, is time remaining in the current job. 
Using equations 4-6  we can derive: 
(7) 
The human capital hypothesis would predict that the coefficient on R, 
is positive, i.e., wage growth is steeper in longer jobs. It is important to 
note that this relationship cannot be measured by  observing the coef- 
ficient on current tenure, en. As equation 7 shows, the coefficient on e,  is 
ambiguous because longer observed tenure (as of the time of the survey) 
implies both that the individual is older (the aging effect P,)  and that 
more will be invested, since for given R, the job will be longer (the 
investment effect p,).  The key to demonstrating that labor turnover and 
on-the-job wage growth are related is the availability of longitudinal data 
which enable us to observe an individual's completed tenure.I6 
It is important to note, however, that an alternative interpretaton can 
be given to the observation of  a positive coefficient on R,.  One could 
simply argue that in jobs where an individual is progressing, i.e., where 
his wages are growing faster than they would elsewhere (perhaps because 
of better opportunities for investment), the individual will have an incen- 
tive to stay. Again, we would observe a positive correlation between 
on-the-job wage growth and completed  job tenure. Actually, either inter- 
pretation highlights the importance of specific human capital in explain- 
ing labor turnover. 
2.2.2  Empirical Results on Wage Growth within the Job 
Table 2.3 presents the results of  estimating equation 7 on both NLS 
samples. In both cases, we selected a group of individuals  who had stayed 
on the job between 1967 and 1969 but who had changed jobs at any time 
during 1969 and 1973. Thus we have a sample of  individuals for whom 
time remaining on the job is 0b~erved.l~  The equations in table 2.3 relate 76  Ann P. Bartel and George J. Borjas 











A. NLS Young Men (n =  156) 
-.om  -  ,0109 
(-.56)  ( -  1 S3) 








B. Mature Men (n  =  747) 
-  .0144  -.W5 
(-2.13)  ( -  1.62) 
-  .0195 
(-2.90) 
-  .m2 
(-2.25) 
REMTEN  ,0245  .0013 
(1.26)  (.W 
Note: The variables held constant in table 2.1 (except D67 and D69) are also held constant 
here. 
Tbe sample is restricted to individuals  who stayed on  the job between 1967 and 1%9 but left 
that job between 1%9 and 1973. 
wage growth in 196749 to previous experience (PREV), current job 
tenure (JOB), time remaining on the job measured as of  1967 (REM- 
TEN), and a set of standardizing variables listed in the note to table 2.1. 
As before, the wage growth equations are estimated in two alternative 
ways: in column 1,  the absolute change in wages over the 1967-69 period 
is the dependent variable, while in column 2, the percentage change in 
wages is analyzed. 
Although the results are not statistically very strong, the coefficient of 
time remaining on the job, REMTEN, has the right sign and seems to be 
more significant for the older men sample.’*  For example, an extra year of 
job tenure in the older men sample increases the hourly wage rate by 
about 2.5 cents more over the 2-year time period under investigation. An 
interesting exercise that can be carried out is to ask how much does the 
positive correlation between completed tenure and wage growth contrib- 
ute to total wage gains on the job? This calculation can be done roughly in 
the following way. First of  all, in terms of  yearly earnings (i.e., 2,000 
hours supplied to the labor market), we obtain the increase in annual 
earnings of  expecting to stay one additional year on the job by multiplying 
.0125 by 2,OOO;I9 this amount is $25.70. The individuals in our sample, in 77  Wage Growth and Job Turnover: An Empirical Analysis 
fact, stayed 20 years on the job (15 years prior to the survey and 5 after the 
survey). Therefore, from an ex ante point of view, staying an additional 
20 years on the job is equivalent to an increase in annual earnings of $514. 
The present value of  this increase in annual earnings over the completed 
job span (20 years of  tenure) is $4,446. Thus there is substantial wage 
growth on the job over and above that obtained if there were no positive 
correlation between wage growth and completed job tenure. In the case 
of young men, even though the coefficient of REMTEN is 8.4 cents, the 
completed tenure is significantly smaller, only 6.6 years (2.9 years before 
the survey, 3.7 years after the survey). Thus the present value of the wage 
gains due to the correlation between completed job tenure and wage 
growth is $2,700.M  Of  course, we recognize that the insignificance of 
REMTEN in our equations indicates the need for further research on this 
question. 
2.3  Labor Turnover and Lifetime Wage Growth 
Parts 2.1 and 2.2 have shown the role that labor turnover plays in 
determining wage growth both across jobs and within the job. We have 
observed that individuals who change jobs voluntarily experience wage 
gains while individuals who stay on the job appear to experience steeper 
wage growth within the job. Thus one cannot predict a priori whether 
turnover leads to smaller or larger lifetime wage growth. In this section 
we suggest how this question can be answered. 
It might seem appropriate to estimate an earnings function of the form: 
(8)  Y,=  q, +  alt +  a,?  +  age  +  a4e2 
where r is total labor force experience and e denotes current job tenure. 
This type of  earnings function is essentially based on the argument that 
on-the-job training is composed both of general and specific  training. The 
coefficients  of r capture the earnings growth of the individual over the life 
cycle, while the coefficients of  e measure any growth which is specific to 
the current job over and above the growth which would have occurred 
due to general labor force experience. Thus, in principle, the estimation 
of  (8) would provide some insight into the importance of  job-specific 
skills in determining the observed wage structure. Unfortunately, a prob- 
lem with this interpretation arises when (8) is applied to a cross-section of 
individuals. In particular, consider an extreme case in which there is no 
specific training, and thus a3  and a  are truly zero. If  individuals self- 
select themselves into different types of jobs because they differ in their 
propensities  to separate-in  other words,  there is population  heter- 
ogeneity-it  may be that individuals who match into a “good” job receive 
high wages and therefore show low propensities to separate and indi- 
viduals with “bad” matches receive low wages and are therefore observed 78  AM P. Bartel and George J. Borjas 
to have high propensities to separate.Z1  In this case, in the cross-section, 
a3  may turn out to be positive artificially! Thus the cross-section  estimates 
of (8) may not be very meaningful in analyzing the relationship between 
turnover and lifetime wage growth. 
Using longitudinal data, however, we can provide a solution to this 
problem. In particular, consider the equation: 
(9)  Y,  -  Yo =  ylt +  y23  +  y3e +  y4e2 
where Yo  gives earnings in the first year of the life cycle. Thus by looking 
at wage growth we net out any individual differences that are unobserved 
but  affect the individual’s earnings throughout  the working life. The 
coefficients  yi  (i = 1, .  .  .  ,4) can be interpreted as the effects of experience 
and job tenure on total life cycle wage progress. In particular, consider 
the extreme  case  in  which  there is  no  specific training.  Clearly the 
coefficients y1  and y2 simply capture scale effects and are expected to be 
positive and negative respectively. If  there is only general training, there 
is no obvious reason why length of current job tenure should provide any 
additional information on total life cycle wage growth. In fact, if mobility 
“pays” (that is, if there are nonnegative gains associated with changing 
jobs), longer tenure implies a smaller propensity for separation. If there 
is serial correlation in this propensity over the individual’s life cycle, this 
implies less turnover in the individual’s previous experience t -  e. But 
under the assumption that mobility pays, the net effect of current tenure 
should then be negative! On the other hand, if wage progress over the life 
cycle is a function not only of total experience but of current job tenure, 
we would expect y3 and y4 to be positive and negative respectively in 
equation 9. If  this is the case, however, the results can be interpreted as 
an indication of the fact that specific training is an important component 
of  wage determination.22  In other words, job tenure matters over and 
above the passage of labor market exposure. 
Unfortunately, the two data sets we use in this paper do not contain any 
information on initial earnings in the life cycle. Moreover, in the young 
men’s NLS the individuals are much too young and both labor market 
experience and job tenure too short to get any robust estimates of  the 
parameters. However, in the older men’s NLS we do have a measure of 
labor market progress made by the individual over the life cycle, since we 
are given the Duncan scale for the initial and current occupations. One 
distinct advantage of  using the Duncan  scale is that the measure of 
“earnings”  is of  a more permanent  nature.= Table 2.4  presents the 
lifetime earnings growth regression estimated for the older men’s NLS. 
The linear job tenure coefficient  is positive and significant, indicating that 
holding total labor force experience constant, longer job tenure is associ- 
ated with higher levels of  total life cycle wage growth. Therefore, the 
results unambiguously show that while mobility that takes place early in 79  Wage Growth and Job Turnover: An Empirical Analysis 
Table 2.4  Effects of Job Tenure on Lifetime Wage Growth, NLS Mature Men 
(Dependent Variable = Y, -  Yo) 
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the life cycle may pay, individuals who have finally settled in a firm 
experience larger lifetime wage growth than individuals who are still 
changing jobs. 
2.4  Effects of  Other Variables 
In the previous sections we  have  documented  that  turnover is  an 
important determinant of  wage growth. In this section we  explore in 
more detail the other determinants of  wage growth for both the young 
men’s and the mature men’s NLS samples. The basic results are pre- 
sented in table 2.5 where wage growth regressions are estimated sepa- 
rately for stayers, quitters, and layoffs in both age samples. In order to 
conserve space we present only the results using arithmetic wage growth. 
The effects of the other variables are interesting. For example, educa- 
tion  has a strong positive effect on the wage growth of  young men. 
Moreover, within the young men’s sample, education affects the wage 
growth of men who separated from the job much more strongly than that 
of  stayers. In the older men sample, however, education has a significant 
effect only for those who quit. Therefore the results seem to suggest that 
education helps to increase the gains from mobility for young men and 
the gains from quitting at older ages. 
The coefficients of experience are quite interesting in the young men’s 
sample. In particular, as predicted in section 2.2, experience has a nega- 
tive effect on the wage growth of stayers. Note, however, that experience 
is positive (though very weak) for both quitters and layoffs, indicating 
that the accumulation of  labor market experience may be helpful in 
creating the gains from mobility. A similar pattern is found for older men: 
experience has a negative effect on the wage growth of stayers, a positive 
effect on the wage growth of quitters and a zero effect on the wage growth 
of people who were laid off. 
Other variables of  some interest  include a union coefficient which 
seems to have a zero or negative effect on the wage growth of  stayers. 
Marital status and the labor force participation status of  the wife have 80  Ann P. Bartel and George J. Borjas 
significantly positive and negative effects respectively on the wage growth 
of  the young men stayers. These effects can be interpreted by arguing that 
marriage  increases  the labor  market  investment  incentives of  males 
(perhaps due to the household division of labor), while if the wife works 
these incentives are diminished. 
Finally, one of the most significant variables in the regression is the size 
of the local labor market. This variable has a strong positive effect on the 
wage growth of stayers. Surprisingly, it has a negative effect on the wage 
growth of older men who were laid off  from their jobs. 
Table 2.5  Effects of Other Variables on Wage Growth (Dependent 
variable =  AYJ 
Stayers  Quitters  Layoffs 
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2.5  Summary 
In this paper we have presented a systematic empirical analysis  of wage 
growth in the National Longitudinal Surveys of Young and Mature Men. 
We  have demonstrated  that labor turnover  is  a significant factor in 
understanding wage growth since it affects both wage growth across jobs 
and wage growth within the job. Some specific findings are summarized 
below. 
1. Although the gains to quitting appear to be positive for young men 
and zero or negative for older men, this was clarified by distinguishing 
among three types of quits: quits due to finding a better job, quits due to 
being dissatisfied with the current job, and quits due to personal reasons. 
It was then shown that in both age groups, individuals who quit because 
they said they found a better job experienced significant wage gains. At 
older ages a quit is mainly due to dissatisfaction with the current job and 
these types of quits do not in general significantly increase earnings. The 
change in the nature of  a quit over the life cycle is the reason for the age 
differences in the impacts of  quits on wages. 
2.  We  extended our  analysis of  the wage gains from mobility by 
comparing not only movers and stayers but individuals to themselves in 
the sense that we analyzed the individual’s wage profile before, during, 
and  after  the  move  to determine  whether  it  had  been  significantly 
affected by mobility. It was shown that at least for the young men, this 
type of  exercise led to the conclusion that a mover significantly gained 
from his actions. 
3.  Labor turnover and wage growth within the job are related through 
a weak positive correlation between wage growth and completed job 
tenure. Individuals who expected to remain on the job an additional year 
experienced steeper wage growth in the current period, ceteris paribus. 
4.  Since labor turnover was found to have offsetting effects on wage 
growth, i.e., to lead to wage gains across jobs but flatter growth in shorter 
jobs, its effect on lifetime wage growth could not be predicted.  Our 
empirical analysis showed, however, that, even when total labor force 
experience is held constant, there exists a strong positive correlation 
between length of current tenure and total life-cycle wage growth. Thus, 
while early mobility may pay, individuals  who are still changing jobs later 
in life experience lower overall wage growth. 
In summary, this paper has tried to show that labor turnover affects not 
only the growth of wages across jobs but also the rate at  which wages grow 
on the job. It is therefore an important factor that must be taken into 
account in any study of  the earnings distribution. 82  Ann P. Bartel and George J. Borjas 
Appendix 
List of Variables 
QUIT 
LAYOFF = 1  if  the individual changed jobs involuntarily 
JOBREL = 1  if  individual quit for job-related reasons (see note 10) 
PERS  = 1  if  individual quit for personal reasons (see note 10) 
PUSH  = 1  if  individual quit because of dissatisfaction with current 
PULL  = 1  if individual quit because he found better job (see note 
EDUC  =  years of  education 
EXPER  = potential experience since date of  completion of 
JOB  = years of job tenure 
ARMY  = years in the military (Young Men only) 
UNION  = 1  if  individual was a member of  a union 
HLTH  = 1  if  individual’s health limits kind or amount of  work 
MAR  = 1  if  individual married with spouse present 
WLFP  = 1  if  individual’s wife was employed 
ww  = wife’s wage rate (Older Men) 
WINC  = wife’s earnings (Young Men) 
WKSUN  = weeks unemployed during the two-year interval 
SIZE  = size of labor force in 1960 of area in which individual lives 
UN  = unemployment rate in area in which individual lives 
D67  = 1  if  observation refers to 1967-69 
D69  = 1  if  observation refers to 196%71 
= 1  if  individual changed jobs voluntarily 




1.  See Mincer (1970) and Sahota (1978) for surveys of  alternative explanations of  the 
2.  Some exceptions are found in the papers by  Lazear (1976) and Wise (1975). 
3.  In previous work (Bartel and Borjas 1977) we  have analyzed the problem of why 
people move. Here we concentrate on establishing the consequences  of labor turnover for 
the individual’s wage-experience profile. 
4.  Jovanovic (1979) provides a model that predicts wage growth on the job based on the 
matching process between the individual and the firm. 
5. An extensive discussion of the role and effects of heterogeneity in the labor market is 
given in Heckman, chapter 3, below. Further analysis of the problem, with labor turnover 
used as the focus, is provided by  Jovanovic and Mincer, chapter 1, above. 
6.  See Bartel(l979) for a detailed analysis of  the relationship between job turnover and 
migration. 
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7. These sample selection  rules are far more serious than they appear to be. In particular, 
in the extreme age groups sampled in the NLS, a significant portion of turnover may be due 
to either retirement or school enrollment changes. 
8.  There are two important qualifications to be noted here. First, in  the young men’s 
NLS, many individuals were enrolled in school in the early years of  the survey. Since we 
concentrate on the labor market behavior of  men permanently attached to the labor force, 
we  do not have observations for these individuals in  the early years, so that pooling 
cross-section and time series less than triples the number of  observations. Secondly, the 
efficiency of  ordinary least squares can be improved upon by  utilizing one of  the many 
methods now available for pooling cross-section and time series. We do not pursue this 
refinement in this paper. 
9.  Recall that these numbers refer to the gains made over the two-year period. To obtain 
annual effects of  labor mobility, simply divide the coefficients by  two. 
10. A job-related quit is one that occurred because the individual (a) was dissatisfied  with 
wages, hours, working conditions, and/or location of his job; (b) disliked his fellow em- 
ployees; or (c) found a better job. A personal quit is one that occurred because of (a) health 
problems or (b) family reasons. For young men, 85 percent of  the quits were job related 
while for the older men 73 percent were job related. 
11. PUSH is defined as a quit that occurred because the individual (a) was dissatisfied 
with wages, hours, working conditions or location of  his job; or (b) disliked his fellow 
employees. PULL is a quit where the individual reports that he found a better job. Among 
the young men, 50 percent of job-related quits were “pulls,” while for the older men only 35 
percent of  these quits were “pulls.” 
12. The calculation uses the formula: 
PV-2,OOO  . (A“)  J‘-’969  e-“ dr 
0 
where AWis the absolute wage increase., 2,000 is the number of hours worked each year, and 
Tis the year of retirement. For young men, T-  1969 is 43 years while for older men it is 10 
years. We assume r equals 10 percent. 
13. These implications follow easily from life cycle optimization models developed by 
Ben-Porath (1967), Becker (1975) and Heckman (1976). 
14. The implications  of this investment function for the wage level equation are derived 
in Borjas (1975, 1981). 
15. If firm and individual investments are positively correlated, then clearly the firm too 
has a smaller incentive to lay off the worker, further lowering the probability of separation. 
16. Although the derivations  in this section are in terms of absolute wage growth, similar 
equations can be derived for percentage wage growth. In particular, the analysis  would then 
be conducted in terms of  time-equivalent investment ratios. These ratios, in turn, would 
then be expected to decline both over the life cycle and within the job. Moreover, if  higher 
levels of  investment can take place only by spending a larger portion of work time investing, 
one would expect a positive correlation between these investment ratios and completed job 
tenure. Thus the analysis may carry over to percentage wage growth. 
17. These sample restrictions, of course, raise the possibility of sample selection  bias; see 
Heckman (1979) for a thorough discussion of  this problem. 
18. There are two possible reasons for the insignificance of REMTEN in the young men’s 
NLS. First, these men are in the very early years of their jobs when investment may not be 
taking place. Second, the usable sample  is very small because during 1967-69  approximately 
half of the individuals were enrolled in school and are deleted from the sample; among the 
remaining 50 percent, the job separation rate is very high thus resulting in further deletions. 
It is interesting to note that by enlarging the young men’s sample to include individuals  who 
did not leave the job by 1973 and assigning an arbitrary value of 10  for REMTEN for these 
individuals, the REMTEN coefficient becomes positive and significant. 84  Ann P.  Bartel and George J. Borjas 
19. We use ,0125 rather than .025 because the wage growth equations refer to two-year 
intervals. 
20.  Note that the coefficient of REMTEN is never significant in column 2 when we deal 
with percentage wage growth. In principle, the correlation between investment and com- 
pleted  tenure need hold only in terms of  dollar investment costs and not in terms of 
time-equivalent investment ratios since it is not clear a priori how initial earnings capacities 
are correlated with completed job tenure. 
21. The problem  of  heterogeneity  versus  state dependence is  discussed in detail in 
Heckman (chapter 3, below) and Jovanovic and Mincer (chapter  1, above). 
22.  Of course, the results could also be consistent with the hypothesis that wages grow on 
the job because of  a successful “match” between employer and employee. In other words, 
an individual’s mobility ultimately led to his finding a firm in which he was able to “move up 
the ladder.” 
23.  The Duncan index is described in Reiss (1961). It is very highly correlated  with 
earnings in the occupation. 
Comment  Gilbert R. Ghez 
The paper by Ann Bartel and George Borjas is an interesting investiga- 
tion of  the relationship between wage growth and turnover. It seeks to 
shed light on this relationship using the theory of  human capital. The 
authors succeed in showing some important empirical regularities charac- 
terizing job mobility.  It is precisely the soundness of  many of  their 
findings which prompts me to take a more careful look at their methods. 
I begin with four general comments on the model,  followed by  a 
number of  shorter comments on empirical implementation. 
1. My  first observation is that the wage path of  movers is surely a 
function of their whole history of job turnover. Repeat job losers presum- 
ably will fair wmse than nonrepeaters not only because each successive 
job loss pushes them into worse options but also because a repeater may 
come to acquire a poor reputation. Employers tend to screen applicants 
on the basis not only of  education but also on their work history. This 
feature is not recognized in the Bartel-Borjas paper, or for that matter in 
the voluminous literature on screening that has emerged in recent years. 
Even for job quitters, a series of former quits may be regarded adversely 
by prospective employers in that they may believe that this applicant’s 
probability  of  quitting soon is  higher than that of  other comparable 
workers. This would reduce the market options of  the repeat quitter. 
Repeat quits may of course also have a beneficial effect: in so far as search 
effort is more intense around the time of  quitting, a repeat quitter may 
well have acquired more information about labor market options than 
other workers and thereby may be able to secure a more rewarding job. 
Gilbert R. Ghez is Associate Professor of  Management and Economics, Roosevelt Uni- 
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The direction of  net impact of  repeat quits on wage growth is thus an 
empirical question. 
Because of  these lagged effects, the error terms in the Bartel-Borjas 
empirical investigation are temporarily correlated. Repeat job changes 
over a given span of time are a more likely occurrence for young men than 
for mature ones. (Although to be sure the total number of job changes is a 
nondecreasing function of  age.) The neglected lags are therefore more 
damaging to the regressions in the sample of young men. This may help 
explain why the effects of current layoffs are less significant there: current 
layoffs are a less perfect measure of  total recent layoffs for young men 
than for older men. The neglected lags may also help explain why in both 
samples the effect of  quits due to dissatisfaction with the current job 
(PUSH) does not have a statistically significant effect. 
It would be most welcome if  in future empirical work more attention 
was paid to this problem. There would be several ways to proceed. A 
natural and simple way would be to run regressions of  wage growth on 
current separation, given that the individual had the same employer for, 
say, the previous five years and compare it to the wage growth of current 
movers who also changed jobs in the previous five years, as well as to the 
wage growth of  those who did not change jobs over the five-year span. 
Presumably job separations in the very distant  past carry no weight 
currently.  A  more  complex  procedure  would  allow  for  differential 
weights to past separations depending on exactly how far in the past they 
occurred. 
2.  My  second comment pertains to modeling the effect of  expected 
completed tenure on current investment costs. Bartel and Borjas assume 
in equation 5 that expected tenure t* affects investment costs C indepen- 
dently of  years of  experience. However, a moment of  reflection should 
convince the reader that optimizing theory predicts that a lengthening of 
expected tenure should have a larger effect on investments the closer the 
worker is to that expected date, for then the returns from longer tenure 
are discounted less heavily. Take for instance the Ben Porath neutral 
model of  investment planning, modified to account for tenure on the 
current job until t* and for tenure in a subsequent job from t* to t** (we 
could introduce more jobs without altering the gist of the argument). The 
discounted value of returns b(t)  from a unit of investment undertaken at 
time t is: 
f'  t* 
b(t)  =  J 
e-  (2  +  S)(s -  + J .**  e-  (i + S)(s -  f) ds 
(1)  f  f* 
where a* is the return per period from a unit of human capital when the 
worker works in the firm where the training is undertaken, a** is the 
return per period in the subsequent job from a unit of  human capital 
acquired in the current job, i is the opportunity cost of funds, and 6  is the 86  Ann P. Bartel and George J. Borjas 
constant rate of  depreciation. If  we assume that a* and a**  are constant 
within each job spell, then b(t)  can be written more compactly as: 
'I  - -  (i +  S)(t"  -  t 
- a*  (a* 
i+6  i+ 6 
i+ 6 
a**  -  (i+ s)(t**  -  r)  -- 
Presumably a*  * <a*  if  the current investment contains a specific compo- 
nent. So long as the worker is still investing, he equates marginal cost of 
investing to its marginal benefit. Total investment cost per period in the 
current job, denoted by C, is then simply (assuming that the production 
function of  human capital does not shift over time): 
dC 
db 
C(t)  =  C[b(t)]  with ->0 
The effect on marginal benefits of a change in expected completed tenure 
on this job, holding constant the total expected work length, is: 
This effect is larger the closer t is to t*, as long as i +  6 >  0: 
(3) 
Hence : 
when i+6>0 and a*>a**. 
To avoid excessive notation here, assume that the current job is the 
first job. The empirical function used by Bartel-Borjas is: 
c,=  a  +  pt* -  pt 
(I use t where they use e in their notation, since my discussion is centered 
on the first job in order to get at the main point). This linear function 
allows t* to affect levels of investments but not slopes. A more appropri- 
ate specification which  conserves much simplicity for the purpose  of 
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(4)  c*=(Y‘  +p‘(t*  -t)+p’f(t*-t)2+y’(t**  -t)+y“(t** -t)2 
where the prediction is that p’ >  0, p”< 0, y‘ >  0, y” <  0. Viewed in this 
framework, Bartel-Borjas are implicitly assuming that p”= 0 and y’l= 0. 
It is useful to point out that if  t** is the same for all individuals in the 
sample, this equation can be implemented with data on expected com- 
pleted tenure and experience (past and current experience). The earnings 
growth equation would be: 
AY,  =  rC, - -  (C,  -  C,  -  1) 
(5)  AY,=T[(Y‘  +p’(t*-t-l)+p”(t*-t-  1)2] 
+yr(t** -t)+ytf(r**  -t)*-(p’+y’) 
+  (p” +  7”) +  2p”(t* -  t)  +  2y”(t** -  t) 
That is, the wage growth equation is a quadratic function of  t and t*: 
(6) 
where the coefficients are: 
AY,  =  ko +  k,t +  k,?  +  k,t* +  k,(t*)2  +  k,tt* 
ko =  ra’ -  (1  +  r)(p’  +  yf  ) +  (1  +  r)(p”  +  y’l) 
+[ryf-2(1+r)y“)]  t**+ry”(t**)2 
kl= -r(p’+y‘)+2(1+r)(p“+y”)-2ryf’t** 
k2 =  r(pf’  +  y”) <  0 
k3=rpf-2(1  +r)p”>O 
k,=rp”<O 
k5= -2rp“>O 
3.  This brings me to another comment. The assumption made by 
Bartel-Borjas that actual completed tenure is a good estimate of expected 
completed tenure is a dubious one. The assumption of  perfect cohort 
expectations was introduced in my NBER study on life cycle consump- 
tion (Ghez and Becker 1975, chapter 2) and is embedded in all studies 
using rational expectations, but the assumption of perfect predictions is a 
poor choice at the level of the individual. Moreover although the assump- 
tion of rational expectations makes sense in the context of  variables that 
are moving with some regularity, I think it is improper to use it in the 
context  of  turnover where  chance events bulk large and where it  is 
difficult to extract information from the past. 
At the least, I would suggest breaking up the sample by variables that 
strongly influence completed tenure: characteristics of  workers such as 
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classification). Then make the assumption that for any individual his 
completed tenure is equal to the average tenure of  the group plus a 
random term. In this way, by constructing a synthetic group, estimates of 
completed tenure effects are less likely to be biased. 
In a more complete framework, expected completed separation from 
the current job is likely to vary over time for the worker. In this case, the 
change in  income would partly  reflect these changed expectations: a 
revised prospect that separation will occur sooner than had been antici- 
pated earlier will reduce the incentive to invest currently. In practice I 
grant that it is difficult to come up with empirical counterparts to these 
expectation variables. 
4. An equally fundamental problem with the Bartel-Borjas model is 
the assumption that job separations are exogenous. Rather than using 
ordinary least squares, they would have done better to construct and 
estimate a turnover equation also. Many of  the standardizing variables 
used by  Bartel-Borjas in  their  wage growth equations are also good 
controls for turnover. Such a turnover equation would depend also on 
anticipated returns from job mobility. The point is not simply that a 
simultaneous equation format would have been more appropriate, but 
also that predicted  turnover could have been used as a more correct 
expected tenure variable. It might then also have been possible to esti- 
mate separately the contribution  of  anticipated turnover and that of 
turnover shocks (less fully anticipated separations) on wage growth. 
I will make a few more brief comments. Their brevity is conditioned by 
the desire to conserve on space. 
5. The 1967-73 period is composed of two distinct periods: 1967-69 is 
a period of  full employment; 1970-73  is characterized by considerably 
more unemployment, recession in 1970-71,  followed by a mild recovery 
in 1972-73. Bartel-Borjas analyze the effects of  1969-71  separations on 
1967-69 wage growth. To the extent that  the  downturn in  1970 was 
unanticipated, it would make sense to compare the effect of  1969-71 
separations on 1967-69 wage growth with the effect of  1971-73  separa- 
tions on 1969-71  wage growth. 
6.  Presumably much turnover occurs immediately or soon after leav- 
ing school. The Bartel-Borjas sample contains only continuous labor 
force participants: those young men (aged 15-25  in 1967) in school full 
time who take summer jobs are excluded from the sample, whereas those 
in school holding continuous part-time jobs are included. Since people 
are likely to change jobs abruptly upon completion of school, it might be 
appropriate to include at least a dummy variable indicating whether or 
not the respondent is in school. This in itself does not solve the sample 
selection problem, but does provide some standardization. 
7. Some additional standardization would have been appropriate. In 
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8. Another standardizing variable which might have been included is 
whether job mobility was accompanied by  geographic mobility. These 
effects are important, as shown in previous work by  Bartel. Why not 
include at least a dummy for geographic mobility on the slope coefficients 
of  quits and layoffs? 
9.  Bartel-Borjas control for unemployment. I presume this reflects 
unemployment prior to job separation. Why not also control for unem- 
ployment at the place of  destination? 
10. Bartel-Borjas find that the size of  the local labor market has a 
stronger effect on the wage growth of  young quitters than on that of 
young stayers. This finding makes sense in the context of search theory, 
and could have been emphasized. 
The virtual absence of effects of the size of local labor markets on the 
wage growth of  mature quitters is puzzling. Perhaps if  the regressions 
were  standardized  by  geographic mobility, a stronger  positive effect 
would be borne out. 
11. Clearly a more appropriate measure of rewards from work would 
include nonpecuniary benefits on the one hand and fringe benefits in the 
form of paid vacations, health insurance plans, pensions, and bonuses on 
the other hand. It is remarkable that Bartel-Borjas get so much mileage 
from their less inclusive wage variable. Eventually, of  course, human 
capital models with more comprehensive measures of rewards from work 
will have to be tested, when data sets suitable for that purpose become 
available. 
Notes 
1. These results generalize to the  case of  nonneutral investments using the methods 
developed in my  unpublished paper “A Note on the Earnings Function When Human 
Capital Is Biased toward Earnings” (1973). 
2. The Mincer-Polachek  (1974) equation is different: it makes investment ratios decline 
with years of  experience within work spells, but holds constant the anticipated duration of 
work in the current (and future) job. 
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